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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**JOINT LOGISTICS:
A DIRECT APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE U.S. MILITARY FOREIGN DISASTER
ASSISTANCE**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The unmatched joint logistics capability of the U.S. military is an invaluable asset to Foreign Disaster Assistance (FDA) operations. When the U.S. military arrives at the scene of the disaster, joint logistics is key to ensuring the aid provided will meet the need of the affected population. The primary role of the U.S. military is to support the lead government agency in charge of the FDA operation and logistic support becomes the main effort. How well the U.S. military performs in this capacity, and how well its capabilities are used is dependent upon its ability to properly align and synchronize efforts with a multitude of participating organizations. This can be especially challenging when working in a chaotic environment where success promotes stability and failure results in unfavorable international attention that can undermine foreign policy objectives. Glaring inefficiencies within the Department of Defense (DoD) logistical pipeline have further compounded those challenges. This paper proposes that joint logistics, through a DoD-led coordinated management approach, can mitigate those challenges and ensure effective U.S. military involvement in future FDA operations.

INTRODUCTION

While the operating environment constantly changes, the outcome the Joint Force Commander expects will not. The Joint Force Commander expects joint logistics to give him sustained logistic readiness which will provide freedom of action to effectively execute operations in support of national objectives.

-ADM Michael G. Mullen, ret.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

With increasing threats to U.S. national security, employing the military to respond to Foreign Disaster Assistance (FDA) missions is no longer viewed as less important than traditional combat and combat support operations because U.S. national security depends on stability around the globe. Man-made and natural disasters, alike, affect peace and stability; therefore, the Department of Defense (DoD) has a proactive approach to minimizing disorder caused by disasters which can negatively affect the DoD's primary mission of keeping the U.S. and her interests safe. As a result, U.S. military support to FDA operations has become an important part of international diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the DoD will continue to be, now and in the foreseeable future, involved in some type of foreign disaster response.

As the U.S. military continues to play a central role in FDA missions, it does not go unnoticed that, in addition to an unmatched, well-equipped force, the U.S. military brings robust logistic assets that are indispensable to the mission. At the core of any FDA operation should be efficient and effective logistics: the art of getting critical commodities and applicable capabilities to the right place, in the right quantity, at the right time, for the right use, and in the most economic manner. The effective delivery of logistic support is essential to the overall success of the relief operation, from first response to recovery and reconstruction. Yet, FDA operations present unique challenges, brought about by the

urgency of each specific mission, that often prevent U.S. military logistical capabilities from being brought to bear with maximum effectiveness.

Some of those challenges stem from glaring inefficiencies within the DoD logistical pipeline that contribute to duplication of effort among U.S. based agencies responding to relief efforts. While the U.S. military has access to a variety of databases and asset visibility tools, those tools do not include assets held by other United States Government (USG) agencies, nor by Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Therefore, military logisticians do not have total visibility of the type, quantity, condition, or location of all relief supplies that could be made available to support FDA operations. This has resulted in the U.S. military arriving at disaster scenes with capabilities that failed to meet the needs of the affected population, and were unsuitable for the local cultural and political context in which they were operating.

This paper proposes that joint logistics, through a DoD-led coordinated management approach, can mitigate those challenges and ensure effective U.S. military involvement in future FDA operations. It further examines how joint logistics can serve as a direct approach to effective U.S. military FDA by reviewing logistics lessons learned from past operations, and offering sound recommendations for conducting future missions. For the purpose of clarification, please note U.S. law refers to foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions as FDA.¹

Joint Logistics at the Core of FDA Operations

Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines joint logistics as the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing

of two or more Military Departments' logistic resources to support the joint force.² The Nation's ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective joint logistics. It delivers sustained logistic readiness for the combatant commander (CCDR) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs).³ Joint logistics is especially valuable because the Services, by themselves, seldom have sufficient capability to independently support the JFC, the ultimate customer. This deliberate sharing of Service logistics resources is expected to enhance synergy and reduce both redundancies and cost. Sharing resources can optimize the apportionment of assets to provide maximum capability to the supported commander.⁴

However, due to diffused resources and systems among the various Service components, the current DoD logistics community remains a very non-joint system. Logisticians face their greatest challenge at the operational level because of the difficulty of coordinating and integrating capabilities from many providers to sustain logistically ready forces for the JFC.⁵ Services use logistics management systems unique to their own set of policies, procedures and information systems. Therefore, the supported commander's capabilities are often limited. The JFC has the overall responsibility of ensuring all aspects of logistics necessary to support the mission comes together, but is dependent upon joint logistics to meet the mission timetable.

The JFC relies on various DoD components, including the military services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and U.S. Transportation Command, to provide the logistics resources and systems needed to support U.S. forces. Various provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code establish responsibilities and authorities for supplying and equipping the armed forces.⁶ These and other Title 10 functions are promulgated by DoD through directives. Implementing joint theater logistics involves harnessing these diffused resources and

systems, which are not integrated but rather separately funded and managed across DoD's components.⁷

U.S. military involvement in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Operation Unified Assistance), the 2005 Pakistan earthquake (Operation Lifeline), and the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Operation Unified Response) highlighted significant logistical challenges when the aid provided mismatched the need of the affected population. Although these challenges do not over shadow the otherwise outstanding contribution the U.S. military made to these relief efforts, they strengthened the argument senior leaders in the logistics community have been making for many years: current logistic systems reflect inefficiencies, redundancies, and process gaps that are driving unacceptable risks across the joint force.⁸ This can be directly attributed to DoD's failure to develop a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and properly oversee joint logistics across the department.

Logistics is one of the most important theaterwide functions. Without adequate and effective theaterwide logistical infrastructure, a campaign or major operation cannot be adequately supported and sustained.⁹ This is especially important since threats to U.S. security, notably Overseas Contingency Operations, uniquely diverse commitments locally and internationally, and complex multinational operations are all at the center of today's joint logistics environment (JLE).

Political and military leaders conduct operations in a complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment. This environment is characterized by uncertainty and surprise. Operations are also distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operations areas within a single theater or across boundaries of more than one geographic combatant commander and can involve a large

variety of military forces and multinational and other government organizations (OGAs).¹⁰

The JLE exists within this operational environment and consists of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of logistic capabilities.¹¹

To better address the conditions, circumstances and influences that negatively affect the logistics capabilities in the JLE, three imperatives for successful joint logistics must be achieved. These are: unity of effort, the coordinated application of all logistics capabilities focused on the JFC's intent; domain-wide visibility, the ability to see the requirements, resources and capabilities across the joint logistics domain; and, rapid and precise response, the ability of the supply chain to effectively meet the constantly changing need of the joint force.¹² To achieve these imperatives, accountability and acquisition procedures must be completely integrated, and therein lies the importance of a DoD-led coordinated management approach to joint integration of logistics across the military forces. The J4 Joint Logistic Strategic Plan stresses the JLE is critical to providing sustained logistics readiness, achieving unity of effort, and giving the JFC the trust and confidence to plan and execute operations unfettered by logistical constraints.¹³

In the FDA environment where unity of effort is of utmost importance, there is a glaring need for information sharing across the whole-of-government spectrum, especially across the military Services. And while it would be extremely challenging to extend that courtesy to NGOs, it is vitally important the DoD implements a way to coordinate unclassified systems and declassified procedures to create a common operating picture among all participating U.S. agencies. To better achieve national security objectives and realize common goals with partnering agencies and nations, the DoD must promote joint logistics by identifying gaps in processes and knowledge within DoD and interagency

partners. Additionally, because the U.S. military's successful participation in FDA operations can only be achieved through the cumulative efforts of other logistics participants across the entire JLE, it is imperative these challenges associated with inefficiencies, such as lack of information sharing, are corrected. Only then can the U.S. military function more effectively in its supporting role. Before specifically addressing how joint logistics can be applied in improving future FDA efforts, it is important to first explain the military's relevance in such operations.

Requesting U.S. Military Assistance

When a JTF arrives to respond to a disaster, it is a behemoth of capability compared to all other interagency, international, and nongovernmental agencies. The unique capability that makes a JTF valuable is the ability to organize and execute logistics operations in a chaotic environment.¹⁴ Ideally, requesting U.S. military involvement in FDA operations should be a last resort option, but given its unique capabilities, primarily in transport, logistics and the ability to deploy rapidly, its assistance is often requested to supplement insufficient civilian agency response.

Before the U.S. military can respond to FDA operations, the following criteria must be met: the disaster must be beyond the ability of the host nation (HN) to handle on its own, the HN must formally request U.S. assistance, and the assistance must be in the strategic interests of the U.S. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is generally quite willing to request the mobilization of military assets for overseas relief missions, and to give DoD relatively wide latitude to work directly with its counterpart in the affected nation.¹⁵ This is especially true when that nation lies within a region of strategic interest, as was the

case during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.¹⁶ Finally, the HN must have exhausted all other options to secure commercial aid and found no comparable civilian alternative to the use of military and civil defense assets being requested.

Once the aforementioned criteria are met, the Department of State (DoS) steps in to serve as the U.S. lead federal agency (LFA), working in close coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), International Organizations such as the United Nations, International Red Cross, Red Crescent and other Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) and NGOs. Within USAID, the OFDA is the primary party responsible for coordinating the USG response to disasters overseas.¹⁷

Despite the formal process for requesting U.S. military assistance, there are instances when formalities are circumvented. For example, the [CCDR] has a limited degree of authority to act alone, generally in the first forty-eight hours of a disaster, to provide emergency assistance when a rapid response is seen as vital to saving life, limb, and property.¹⁸ In such cases, the [CCDR] may deploy military and civil defense assets under his or her control to the disaster site without prior DoD approval.¹⁹ When the decision to deploy U.S. military assets in support of FDA operations is made, whether formally or informally, the goal is to ensure the immediate needs of the affected population are effectively met. And, although properly identifying priority local needs rests with HN personnel, USAID, NGOs, OFDA, and other stakeholders involved in the disaster relief effort, that information is not often readily forthcoming. Gaining visibility of the requirements, sensing competing priorities and adjusting continuously as the situation unfolds to ensure sustained readiness over time are the primary challenges for logisticians during disaster relief operations.²⁰ Hence, the U.S. military often gets to the disaster scene with whatever assets are available

vice what is actually needed. Given the fact that the USG responds to approximately 70 to 80 natural disasters worldwide annually, but the DoS and USAID may only receive U.S. military support for 10-15 percent of those disasters reiterates the importance of joint logistics ensuring the JFC success. This is important because although the overall percentage of disasters requiring military support is relatively small, these disasters tend to be crises of the largest magnitude and/or the greatest complexity.²¹ Improving our processes to meet those complexities should be a priority as this is where joint logistics can have the best effect. At the operational level, joint logistics has its most significant impact.²² It is at the operational level that strategic and tactical capabilities, processes, and requirements intersect, and it is here where the essence of joint logistics resides.²³

Time, Space, Force and Joint Logistics

During FDA operations, the factor of time, or lack thereof, is of the essence. Within the first days of the crisis, deploying military assets to conduct search-and-rescue operations or transport large quantities of relief supplies can literally save lives. Many crisis response missions, such as foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, require time-sensitive sourcing of critical commodities and capabilities, and rapid delivery to the point of need.²⁴ In these operations, joint logistics is most often the main effort.²⁵

This was the case during Operation Unified Assistance where the focus of the mission was to prevent further loss of life by expeditiously applying resources to the overall relief effort. The earthquake that created the 26 December 2004 tsunamis measured just over 9.0 on the Richter scale and was centered under the Indian Ocean floor just to the west of Indonesia.²⁶ In terms of lives lost, the most destructive tsunami ever recorded, had a human

toll of 157,577 killed, 26,763 missing, and 1,075,350 displaced.²⁷ Initial reports were misleading and a few days elapsed before a more accurate picture emerged.

Unreliable communications meant initial death tolls were vastly underreported and, accordingly, foreign aid did not begin to flow to the region as quickly as it might have otherwise.²⁸ Only belatedly did the governments in the affected areas announce they were unable to cope, and only two or three days after the tsunamis struck did the international press begin to understand and report the true scale of the disaster.²⁹ However, once the severity of the crisis was realized, the U.S. military was deployed without delay.

Time lost can never be regained.³⁰ Therefore, the pressure to get US aid to the disaster location was heightened. Ships got to sea almost immediately upon receiving orders and they were authorized to use maximum safe speeds. Few surface ships in existence could have reached the disaster area more quickly than they did.³¹ A strike group led by the carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72) quickly left Hong Kong, and a seven-ship expeditionary strike group led by the helicopter/dock landing ship USS *Bonhomme Richard* (LHD 6) proceeded from Guam.³² More specifically, the U.S. military provided twenty-six ships, eighty-two planes, and fifty-one helicopters to help deliver more than 24.5 million tons of relief supplies and enable USAID and other disaster relief agencies to move much-needed aid to inaccessible areas affected by the tsunami.³³

While it appeared on the surface the US-led effort was seamlessly flawless, the logistical process was not a smooth one. Given the fast pace of events, insufficient and inaccurate flow of information, situational awareness during the initial stages of the operation was very poor; as a result, the U.S. military could not obtain an “authoritative requirement” vice what was “speculated” as needed for the relief effort. JTF 536, hastily stood up two

days after the tsunami struck, was commanded by Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman, Jr., then Commanding General of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. Blackman readily acknowledged he had “really very little information on the extent of the disaster and the unique requirements of each of the three primary countries that we’re conducting relief operations in.”³⁴ To compound matters, USG agencies did not know of each other’s capabilities, and did not understand the overall approach to providing aid. Therefore, although the effort to get to the location proved timely, expeditiously applying resources to the overall relief effort, overwhelmed military members and the local population alike.

Logistical supplies flowed into the area from all over the world, but the tsunami’s destruction of roads, bridges and docks made certain areas virtually inaccessible; therefore, sea basing facilitated the mission without reliance on infrastructure ashore. No matter where supplies came from, however, it was generally the sea-based U.S. Navy ships that became responsible for coordinating the logistical flow.³⁵ While the sea bases were efficient, the logistics interface with the local government was not so smooth, making that aspect of the effort often chaotic and ad hoc.³⁶

Getting supplies from the sea-based ships to the displaced population placed extraordinary demands on helicopter pilots who flew delivery missions around the clock, and were forced to come up with innovative ways to safely deliver supplies. Crowds of starving people on the ground prevented helicopters from landing with food, water, medical supplies and other necessities. Domain-wide visibility of theater assets would have alerted the JTF commander to the need for helicopter hoists to lower pallets of supplies; this would have enabled an alternative to the singular plan of having to land helicopters. Pilots decided it was not safe to land because they were not equipped with hoists to lower supplies to the ground

and this meant supplies were not delivered.³⁷ Once the local population realized the importance of clearing areas to accommodate hovering helicopters, pilots were then able to land. However, they merely off loaded supplies and flew back to sea-based ships to replenish. As a result of not monitoring the distribution process, deliveries did not make it to those who were in dire need; instead, they fell into the hands of individuals who did not have the best interest of the population at heart. As one senior agency official reported, “We’ve had some reports of TNI [Indonesia military personnel] . . . hoarding supplies—up to 30 percent in some places.”³⁸ Such logistical break downs could have been avoided, and getting critical commodities and applicable capabilities to the displaced population in the least amount of time could have been better accomplished had a functioning DoD-led coordinated management approach to joint logistics been in place.

This point can be further argued when discussing the factor of space as it relates to Operation Lifeline, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake that struck northern Pakistan on 8 October 2005. The earthquake measured 7.6 on the Richter scale, and the government of Pakistan estimated that over 70,000 people were killed in the disaster which struck with sudden and unexpected fury.³⁹ Although most of the affected region was remote terrain, U.S. military forces were able to expeditiously arrive on location due to significant resources in the Persian Gulf, specifically from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Directed by U.S. Central Command, Rear Admiral Mike LeFever, then commanding officer of the Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group, stood up JTF Disaster Assistance Center-Pakistan (DAC-PAK) within 48 hours of the disaster. The mission was to conduct humanitarian assistance operations in support of the Government of Pakistan.⁴⁰ Consequently, valuable response time transiting relief forces to the affected area was not lost, and the critical aspect of time

was positively affected. Yet, there was more to the factor of space that affected logistics and the U.S. military's interaction with the Government of Pakistan.

The factor of space encompasses not only the physical environment and weather/climate but also the so-called "human-space."⁴¹ Among other things, the human-space includes such elements as the political system and nature of government, population size and density, economic activity, transportation, trade, ideologies, ethnicity, religions, social structure and traditions, culture, and technology.⁴²

The U.S. military had to earn the trust of the local population, especially the Pakistani military during the demanding 6-month mission. Prior to the October earthquake, and largely because of the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, most Pakistanis viewed the United States with uneasiness.⁴³ Nevertheless, the need for the U.S. military's capabilities superseded differences and encouraged a cooperative effort to accomplish the mission. A major challenge for the U.S. military was clearing logistic bottlenecks brought about by the influx of relief supplies to the only operating airfield, Pakistan's Chaklala Air Force Base. The amount of supplies overwhelmed the capability of air and ground transportation assets and demanded intricate coordination to obviate logistic jams.⁴⁴ Prior to the establishment of JTF DAC-PAK, there were no heavy-lift assets available to transport supplies, trapped for weeks at the airfield, to the point-of-need.

Due to the lack of asset visibility, the JTF commander relied solely on U.S. heavy-lift assets, predominately CH-47 Chinooks helicopters, to move mountains of relief supplies in an attempt to clear the logistic jams. Helicopters flew more than 5,200 sorties, carrying almost 17,000 passengers, 3,751 of whom were casualties.⁴⁵ They delivered more than 14,000 tons of humanitarian aid supplies, up to 200 tons per day.⁴⁶ U.S. helicopters came to

be seen as “angels of mercy” by Pakistanis who had previously expressed hostility towards America.⁴⁷ But, the demands placed on U.S. pilots and crewmembers took its toll. Eventually, Admiral LeFever pulled together helicopter assets from the UN, the Pakistani army, and other countries, developed a common operating picture, and then began delivering aid.⁴⁸ This eased the burden placed on the U.S. military, but could have been accomplished earlier if coordination between disparate agencies were better orchestrated. Yet, this was no fault of the JTF commander since being able to properly coordinate efforts meant, first and foremost, having a complete and accurate picture of U.S. military assets in theater. Joint logistics, through a DoD-led coordinated management approach, would have provided the JTF commander such.

Moving on to the factor of force as it relates to joint logistics, Operation Unified Response provides an example of how the arrival of large numbers of foreign military assets can burden the very disaster area it is supposed to provide help. When the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that devastated the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti, hit on 12 January 2010, a U.S. military deployment of historic proportion responded to the catastrophe. U.S. Southern Command, under the direction of Lieutenant General Ken Keen, stood up JTF Haiti. Nearly 22,000 service members, many of them diverted from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, arrived on station to assist with recovery and reconstruction efforts.⁴⁹ The addition to the already large footprint made by other contributing foreign military forces was criticized for excessive show and unnecessary aggressiveness.⁵⁰ Several NGOs criticized the massive U.S. military presence, especially for occupying strategic Haitian military facilities that were still severely damaged and for hindering the arrival of aid.⁵¹

Such accusations stemmed from this fact: the nearly collapsed Haitian government turned over control of the only functional airport in the country's capital, Port-au-Prince, to the U.S. military. With the military in charge of air traffic control, the perception was priority was being given to U.S. assets. According to an official involved in the relief operation, there were growing tensions over which country's planes were allowed to land first as each nation insisted its aid flight was priority.⁵² The large military footprint, with overlapping capabilities of other foreign militaries, did not help the negative perception of the U.S. military. In fact, it compounded the serious logistical problems associated with getting aid to the disaster victims in a timely fashion. Because much of the requirements sent to Haiti were delayed in transportation routes, it appeared the U.S. military did not give priority to logistics support for the affected population or to that of other foreign military, but instead made the priority the sustainment of its own force. Whether or not these claims were true, logistical support for participating forces should never be overlooked during a joint operation, and Milan Vego, author of *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, and a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, warns against doing so. Properly understood, however, the factor of force includes not only troops, naval forces, and air forces, but also the forces of all services with their required logistical support.⁵³

As with the other two operations previously discussed, Operation Unified Response required a common operational picture for logistics. A DoD-led coordinated management approach to joint logistics will provide the JFC that common operational picture which will, in turn, give him the freedom of action needed to effectively execute future FDA operations.

Counter-Arguments

There is considerable debate regarding whether the U.S. military is the most appropriate organization to provide disaster assistance. It has been argued that U.S. military forces should not be committed to missions that should remain inherently civilian because it could tip the balance towards security and negatively affect the overarching role of the military. However, given the strength and capabilities of the U.S. military, it is, and will be in the foreseeable future, called upon to provide FDA. And, since logistics is at the core of the U.S. military's contribution to FDA operations, it is inherent to develop better tools to streamline the interaction and decrease parallel efforts of the military, OGAs and NGOs. Fixing the inefficiencies in the military logistical system is the first step to providing a direct approach to effective U.S. military FDA. Another counter-argument might be a DoD-led coordinated management approach to joint logistics will not effectively harness diffused resources and systems among the various Service components. It will, in fact, enable the capability to build effective, responsive, and efficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline; exercise control over the pipeline from end to end; and provide certainty to the supported JFC that forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on time.⁵⁴

Conclusion

The U.S. military support of FDA operations remains a powerfully strategic approach to achieving political ends. Therefore, we must improve upon the fragmented and compartmentalized Service logistics support structure currently in place. Utilizing readily available tools and technology to make joint logistics a better coordinated venture during

FDA will ensure the U.S. military's effort is not ad hoc or disconnected from other aid partners. All USG participants will have the ability to input their logistical data, creating a common operational logistical picture for the JFC. The JFC can, in turn, better coordinate and manage all resources as he synchronizes efforts with other FDA participants to aid the overall mission. Not only could this measure better manage resources thus saving time and money, it may also save lives.

Recommendations

Currently, joint operations create high demands for logistics resources and FDA missions are no different. When the U.S. military is called upon, joint logistics is the answer to increased efficiencies and greater effectiveness, but only through proper implementation across the U.S. military. It is time to make overdue changes to the DoD logistics infrastructure to improve this process. A properly coordinated and managed DoD-led approach to joint logistics will enable unity of effort, domain-wide visibility, and rapid and precise response by holding individual Services accountable to set standards. By standardizing the various Service systems currently in place, it will eliminate inter-service logistic differences and ensure streamlined support to the CCDR. Supporting agencies both within and outside of the military, such as the Military Sealift Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, civilian contractors, and numerous other critical agencies, must be integrated fully to maximize support for the force, but this can only be done after inefficiencies within the U.S. military logistical system are fixed.

A good example of what a DoD-led coordinated management approach to joint logistics during FDA operations is for the DoD to establish a web-based portal for the Services to access and update a Joint Logistics Database. The web-based portal would only become activated during FDA operations and would have a user friendly design like Facebook and capability like Google to search through logistical data in order to provide meaningful and timely resource reports to the JFC. FDA participants would be able to access the web portal and upload their logistic data file, in the form of a spreadsheet, into the online database. The database would organize all information into groups and or categories based on priorities and search parameters set by the JFC. The database will provide a timeline report that, much like Facebook, would provide real time updates on the coordination of assets with the who, what, when, where, and how for all participants to monitor and execute as seamlessly as possible. The key is the JFC would be able to sift through all of the logistical and resource data, produce an organized and coordinated plan, share that plan with all participants in real time and provide feedback in case the plan needs to change. Additionally, the portal would have a reporting feature for on-site field updates (e.g. bottlenecks, videos, pictures, and recommendations which can be highly beneficial). Furthermore, this measure would achieve the imperatives for successful joint logistics capabilities within JLE by providing a unity of effort, domain-wide visibility, and rapid and precise response.

ENDNOTES

¹ Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief, Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below, (Washington, D.C., 13 July 2012), 1-1.

² U.S. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. (Washington, D.C., CJCS, 2012), 178.

³ U.S. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics, Joint Publication (JP) 4-0* (Washington, D.C., CJCS, 2008), vii.

⁴ Christianson, *Joint Logistics-Shaping Our Future: A Personal Perspective*, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 2006), 76.

⁵ USO CJCS, *JL, JP*, I-5.

⁶ See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.

⁷ General Accountability Office, *Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach* (Washington, D.C., June 2007), 2.

⁸ Christianson, *Joint Logistics-Shaping Our Future: A Personal Perspective*, 79.

⁹ Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 2009), viii-75.

¹⁰ USO CJCS, *JL, JP*, viii.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I-4.

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